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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
OLIVER, District Judge. 
I. 
 In this insurance dispute, Defendant-Appellant James 
Sweeney (“Mr. Sweeney”) appeals from the Order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company (“Liberty Mutual”).  Liberty Mutual cross-appeals 
from the portion of the District Court‟s Order rejecting two 
alternative and independent bases for denying Mr. Sweeney 
coverage under his insurance policy.  For the following 
reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court, 
and remand with instructions for the District Court to enter 
judgment in favor of Mr. Sweeney.  Liberty Mutual‟s cross-
appeal is dismissed. 
II. 
At all relevant times, Mr. Sweeney owned and 
operated a transmission repair shop in Chalfont, 
Pennsylvania.  During the course of managing his repair shop, 
Mr. Sweeney developed an informal business relationship 
with George Tradewell (“Mr. Tradewell”), who owned a car 
rental business in nearby Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania.  As 
part of this business relationship, Mr. Sweeney would refer 
his customers to Mr. Tradewell if they needed to rent a 
vehicle while their own vehicles were in Mr. Sweeney‟s shop 
for repair.  In his deposition, Mr. Tradewell estimated that he 
would rent vehicles to one or two of Mr. Sweeney‟s 
customers per month. 
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 The manner in which the rental cars would be 
delivered to Mr. Sweeney‟s customers varied.  On some 
occasions, Mr. Sweeney would simply refer his customers to 
Mr. Tradewell‟s shop or drive them to Mr. Tradewell‟s 
business.  If any of Mr. Tradewell‟s employees were 
available, Mr. Tradewell would have them drop off a rental 
car at Mr. Sweeney‟s shop. As another option, Mr. Sweeney 
would pick up a rental car from Mr. Tradewell‟s business and 
deliver it to the customer either that day or the following 
morning.  On those instances where Mr. Sweeney came into 
possession of a rental car for the purpose of delivering it to 
one of his customers, Mr. Sweeney would occasionally use 
the car to run personal errands.  This was encouraged by Mr. 
Tradewell, who asked Mr. Sweeney to use those occasions as 
opportunities to make sure the cars were running properly. 
 On February 4, 2004, at 8:17 p.m., Mr. Sweeney was 
injured in a car accident while driving a 2000 Ford Taurus 
owned by Mr. Tradewell‟s business.  Mr. Tradewell had no 
firsthand knowledge of how and when Mr. Sweeney came 
into possession of the car, and was out of the state on the day 
of the accident.  At his deposition, Mr. Sweeney also could 
not recall when he came into possession of the vehicle, but 
testified that he intended to deliver it to a customer the 
following morning.  That evening, Mr. Sweeney‟s wife asked 
him to go to a local grocery store to pick up taco shells for 
their dinner.  Mr. Sweeney opted to use Mr. Tradewell‟s 2000 
Ford Taurus to run this errand because it was the outermost 
car in his driveway.  He was involved in the accident on his 
way back from the grocery store.  Following the accident, Mr. 
Sweeney filed an application for underinsured motorist 
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(“UIM”) benefits1 pursuant to his insurance policy with 
Liberty Mutual, which claim Liberty Mutual denied, relying 
upon three policy provisions: 
1. The “auto business” exclusion: “We will 
not pay for bodily injury sustained while 
using a non-owned motor vehicle in any 
kind of auto business. Examples of auto 
business are: selling, repairing, servicing, 
storing or parking motor vehicles.”  
(App. 64a.)  
2. The “intended use” provision: “You and 
a resident relative are insured while 
using a non-owned car.  The owner must 
give permission to use it.  It must be used 
in a way intended by the owner.”  (App. 
53a.) 
3. The “regular use” provision: “We will 
not pay for bodily injury sustained while 
using or occupying a motor vehicle or 
trailer not insured under this Part, that is 
furnished or made available for regular 
use by you or a household resident.”  
(App. 63a.) 
                                              
1
 As this Court has explained, “UIM insurance is designed to 
protect an insured from a negligent driver of another vehicle 
who causes injury to the insured, but through no fault of the 
insured, lacks adequate insurance coverage to compensate the 
insured for his or her injuries.”  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Cosenza, 258 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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 On May 25, 2006, Liberty Mutual filed an action for 
declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Liberty Mutual sought a 
declaration providing that Mr. Sweeney was not entitled to 
coverage on the basis of the three provisions cited above.  
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. 
Sweeney on the basis that the second exclusion did not bar 
coverage, and denied Liberty Mutual‟s cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  Liberty Mutual appealed, and on March 
23, 2009, this Court summarily remanded the case to the 
District Court as a result of the District Court‟s failure to 
address all three policy exclusions relied upon by Liberty 
Mutual.  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 317 F. App‟x 185 
(3d Cir. 2009).  This Court explained that the District Court‟s 
ruling was improper because “Liberty Mutual need only 
prove that one of its asserted policy exclusions applies.”  Id. 
 On remand, the District Court granted Liberty 
Mutual‟s motion for summary judgment and denied Mr. 
Sweeney‟s motion for summary judgment, finding that while 
the “intended use” and “regular use” provisions did not bar 
coverage, Liberty Mutual could nevertheless deny coverage 
on the basis of the “auto business” provision.  Mr. Sweeney 
timely appealed the Order of the District Court.  Liberty 
Mutual filed a cross-appeal challenging the District Court‟s 
determinations concerning the “intended use” and “regular 
use” provisions. 
III. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
review the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment de 
novo and apply the same standard the District Court applied.  
Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 
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2011). We review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in the nonmoving 
party‟s favor.  See Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 
1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992).  We will affirm if our review 
shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
IV. 
 On appeal, Mr. Sweeney argues that the District Court 
erred in holding that Liberty Mutual could deny coverage on 
the basis of the policy‟s “auto business” exception.  Mr. 
Sweeney argues that this provision does not bar coverage 
because, at the time of the accident, he was running a 
personal errand and was not engaged in any type of “auto 
business” as defined by the policy.  As an initial matter, Mr. 
Sweeney notes that the District Court considered the wrong 
policy language in interpreting the “auto business” exception.  
The language considered by the District Court provided, in 
pertinent part, that Liberty Mutual “will not pay for bodily 
injury caused by anyone using a non-owned motor vehicle in 
any kind of auto business.”  (App. 54a.)  However, prior to 
Mr. Sweeney‟s 2004 accident, certain provisions in his 
insurance policy had been amended, including the “auto 
business” provision.  The amended provision provided that 
Liberty Mutual “will not pay for bodily injury sustained while 
using a non-owned motor vehicle in any kind of auto 
business.  Examples of auto business are: selling, repairing, 
servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles.”  (App. 64a 
(emphasis added).) 
 Interpreting the original policy language, the District 
Court held that “the relevant issue is not one of timing as 
 8 
Defendant contends, but whether the language „in any kind of 
auto business‟ pertains to Defendant‟s use of the „non-owned‟ 
vehicle.”  (App. 11a.)  The District Court further emphasized 
that “but for Defendant‟s desire to provide his customers with 
an alternative means of transportation while he serviced the 
customers‟ transmissions, Defendant would never have come 
into possession of the „non owned‟ vehicle.  The specific 
reason for Defendant‟s use at the time of the accident is not 
enough to change the general purpose for which he possessed 
the vehicle.”  (App. 12a.)  Liberty Mutual concedes that the 
District Court did not consider the correct language, but 
argues that the result would nevertheless be the same under 
the amended policy language.
2
  We disagree. 
 In this case, it is undisputed that, at the time of the 
accident, Mr. Sweeney was engaged in a personal errand, i.e., 
he was returning home from a trip to the grocery store, and 
that he used a non-owned vehicle which was to be delivered 
to a customer the following morning.  The dispositive 
                                              
2
 The record reveals that Sweeney did not file a motion for 
reconsideration, which would have been appropriate in light 
of the District Court‟s failure to evaluate the correct 
provision.  This Court has explained that the “purpose of a 
motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law 
or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”  Harsco 
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985).  
Nevertheless, we possess the authority to issue the relief 
requested by Sweeney.  On an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, “we are free to enter an order directing 
the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the 
appellant,” where, as here, the appeal raises only issues of 
law.  Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 339 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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question before the court is whether his injuries were 
“sustained while using a non-owned motor vehicle in any 
kind of auto business,” notwithstanding the fact that at the 
time of the accident he was using Mr. Tradewell‟s vehicle for 
a personal endeavor. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, the interpretation of a 
contract of insurance is a matter of law for determination by 
the court.  Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. 
Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983).  The court‟s “primary 
goal in interpreting a policy . . . is to ascertain the parties‟ 
intentions as manifested by the policy‟s terms.”  Kvaerner 
Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006).  The court construes 
“[w]ords of common usage . . . according to their natural, 
plain, and ordinary sense.”  Id.  To this end, the court “may 
consult the dictionary definition of a word to determine its 
ordinary usage.”  Id.  Contractual terms are ambiguous “if 
they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation 
when applied to a particular set of facts.”  Madison Const. 
Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 
1999).  If the court finds that a particular term is ambiguous, 
“the policy provision is to be construed in favor of the insured 
and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement.”  
Standard Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 566 (citation 
omitted).  If “however, the language of the contract is clear 
and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that 
language.”  Id.  We find that the “auto business” exclusion at 
issue in this case is unambiguous, and does not operate to bar 
coverage in this case. 
 While the District Court held that “the relevant issue is 
not one of timing,” (App. 16a), this is incorrect when one 
considers the actual policy language.  The relevant “auto 
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business” exception bars coverage for injuries “sustained 
while using a non-owned motor vehicle in any kind of auto 
business.”  The operative clause is “sustained while using,” 
which unambiguously imposes a temporal restriction.  The 
word “while” is defined as “the time during which an action 
takes place or a condition exists.”  Webster‟s Third New 
International Dictionary, Unabridged (Merriam-Webster 
2002), http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (last accessed 
May 30, 2012).  The exclusion is triggered in “the time during 
which” the insured is “using a non-owned motor vehicle in 
any kind of auto business.”  At the time of the accident, Mr. 
Sweeney was using Mr. Tradewell‟s car for the purpose of 
running a personal errand, and not using it “in any kind of 
auto business.”  The fact that the car was a rental vehicle 
which was to be eventually delivered to a customer is not 
dispositive; pursuant to the plain language of the policy, we 
look to the conduct Mr. Sweeney was engaged in at the time 
of the accident. 
 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to 
analyze a similar policy provision, various panels of the 
Superior Court have interpreted policies containing various 
“auto business” exceptions and have similarly examined the 
timing and circumstances of the accident.  See, e.g., McKuhn 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 664 A.2d 175, 177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995) (holding exclusion applied where, “at time of the 
accident,” driver “was engaged in the business of parking 
vehicles” and accident “occurred during McKuhn‟s working 
day during his employment as a parking attendant”); Pecorara 
v. Erie Ins. Exch., 596 A.2d 237, 239-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1991) (holding exclusionary clause did not apply where “at 
the time of the accident” truck was being used “to haul shale 
to improve a parking lot” which was “not the normal use of 
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an automobile . . . while engaged in the automobile [repair] 
business”); Zizza v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 761, 762 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1980) (holding exclusion applied where at the time of the 
accident, employee of auto repair business was driving 
customer‟s car to his shop for repairs, “in furtherance of the 
interests of [employer]”).3 
This line of cases teaches us that “we are to examine 
the conduct at issue to see if it is contemplated by the 
exclusion.”  McKuhn, 664 A.2d at 177.  That is because such 
“automobile business” exclusions are typically intended to 
“encompass a specific risk,” Percorara, 596 A.2d at 239, 
namely the risks associated with the operation of the 
automobile businesses.  See also McKuhn, 664 A.2d at 177 
(“We must ask whether the exclusion was meant to protect 
against the risk occasioned by the conduct.”).  At argument, 
counsel for Liberty Mutual questioned whether a focus on the 
timing and circumstances of the accident provides an 
appropriate limiting principle.  However, we need not define 
the outer limits of the auto business exception at issue here 
because the facts of this case are not at the margins.  Mr. 
Sweeney‟s accident did not take place as he was making a 
brief rest stop on his way to deliver the car to a customer; Mr. 
Sweeney was returning from a trip to the grocery store in a 
car that he intended to deliver to a customer the next day.  
Because Mr. Sweeney‟s injuries were sustained while he was 
using the non-owned vehicle to run a personal errand after 
                                              
3
 In the absence of guidance from Pennsylvania‟s Supreme 
Court, we may look to intermediate appellate court decisions 
tending to show how the Supreme Court would decide the 
issue.  See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 
86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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work hours, and not while he was engaged “in any kind of 
auto business,” we reverse the decision of the District Court 
finding that coverage was precluded by the “auto business” 
exception. 
V. 
 On cross-appeal, Liberty Mutual challenges the 
District Court‟s determination regarding the “intended use” 
provision of the insurance policy.
4
  The District Court 
originally addressed the “intended use” provision in its 
January 4, 2008 Order granting judgment in favor of Mr. 
Sweeney, which this Court summarily reversed so that the 
District Court could address all three policy provisions.  The 
District Court incorporated this analysis into its October 7, 
2011 Order granting Liberty Mutual‟s summary judgment 
motion.  (App. 9a, n. 1.)  The District Court held that “Mr. 
Tradewell‟s understanding and consent to the occasional use 
of his cars to run personal errands” was clear from the record, 
(App. 16a, n.1), and thus Liberty Mutual had not 
demonstrated a breach of the “intended use” provision, which 
provides that “[Mr. Sweeney] and a resident relative are 
insured while using a non-owned car.  The owner must give 
permission to use it.  It must be used in a way intended by the 
owner.”  Before this Court, Liberty Mutual argues that “[t]he 
                                              
4
 We note that in this case, a cross-appeal was not necessary 
to preserve Liberty Mutual‟s arguments concerning the 
remaining two policy provisions, even though the District 
Court rejected Liberty Mutual‟s two alternative grounds for 
denying Sweeney UIM benefits.  In raising these points on 
appeal, Liberty Mutual has “asserted no more than a defense 
of the judgment in its favor.”  Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 
72, 78 n.8 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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policy language is clear: the non-owned vehicle must be used 
in a way that the owner both permitted and intended.  
Otherwise, the policy language would be redundant.”  
(Appellee/Cross-Appellant‟s br. at 24.)  Liberty Mutual 
argues that this provision was breached, citing to the 
following deposition testimony of Mr. Tradewell: 
Q. Now, can we agree that in your statement 
you‟ve indicated that you were aware that Mr. 
Sweeney would use your vehicles for personal 
errands? 
A. It was not intended, although not forbidden. 
(App. 252a.)  On the basis of Mr. Tradewell‟s conclusory 
statement that such use “was not intended,” Liberty Mutual 
argues that “Mr. Tradewell‟s permission to use the vehicle on 
a personal errand . . . is not enough to escape this policy 
exclusion when Mr. Tradewell‟s own testimony is that Mr. 
Sweeney‟s personal errand „was not intended.‟”  
(Appellee/Cross-Appellant‟s br. at 24.) 
 Liberty Mutual, however, selectively quotes Mr. 
Tradewell‟s deposition testimony, omitting testimony which 
unequivocally shows that the vehicle was being used in a 
manner contemplated by the owner: 
Q. How did you first become aware that Mr. 
Sweeney would run personal errands in your 
vehicles? 
A. I asked him to. 
. . . 
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Q. When you say personal errands, you mean 
personal on behalf of you, or personal on behalf 
— I guess I looked at it differently.  You mean 
personal on behalf of you, or do you mean 
personal on behalf of him? 
A. Him. 
. . . 
A. Rather than use his personal car for running 
an errand, I would prefer him use mine to get 
the road experience and give me an opinion. 
. . . 
Q. I‟m not asking you whether it was allowed in 
retrospect.  I‟m asking you whether or not 
before this accident you knew that he was 
taking your vehicles and going to the super 
market with them? 
A. Yes. 
(App. 253a-256a.) 
 The operative term in this provision is unambiguous.  
The word “intended” is defined as “to have in mind.”  
Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 
(Merriam-Webster 2002), http://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com (accessed May 30, 2012).  The deposition 
testimony in this case reflects that Mr. Tradewell clearly had 
in mind that Mr. Sweeney might be using his vehicles to run 
personal errands on those occasions where he came into 
possession of them.  In fact, he encouraged Mr. Sweeney to 
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do so as a means of getting Mr. Sweeney‟s opinion regarding 
the condition of his cars.  Liberty Mutual has put forth no 
evidence showing that Mr. Tradewell did not have in mind 
that Mr. Sweeney would be using his vehicles to run personal 
errands, and thus the District Court properly rejected Liberty 
Mutual‟s contention that this provision was breached. 
VI. 
 Finally, we address Liberty Mutual‟s argument 
concerning the policy‟s “regular use” exclusion, which 
provides that “[Liberty Mutual] will not pay for bodily injury 
sustained while using or occupying a motor vehicle or trailer 
not insured under this Part, that is furnished or made available 
for regular use by you or a household resident.”  After noting 
that “[g]enerally, courts have found the term „regular use‟ 
unambiguous in exclusion of automobile liability coverage,” 
(App. 13a), the District Court held that “it is obvious that 
[Mr. Sweeney‟s] use of the „non-owned‟ vehicle was not 
habitual but merely incidental to a service offered as a 
convenience to his customers.”  (App. 14a.)  On cross-appeal, 
Liberty Mutual argues that “the test for „regular [use]‟ does 
not consider how often the fleet of vehicles is actually used, 
but rather whether the group of vehicles was regularly 
available for use.”  (Appellee/Cross-Appellant‟s br. at 30.)  
Liberty Mutual further argues that “[g]iven the nature of the 
relationship between their two businesses, [Mr. Tradewell] 
made vehicles available for Mr. Sweeney‟s regular use in 
connection with his transmission repair business.”  (Id. at 31.)  
We disagree, and hold that the “regular use” exclusion does 
not operate to bar coverage for Mr. Sweeney‟s injuries. 
 As both Mr. Sweeney and Liberty Mutual note, courts 
have routinely found “regular use” exclusions to be 
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unambiguous.  See, e.g., Brink v. Erie Ins. Grp., 940 A.2d 
528, 533 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (holding exclusion is not 
ambiguous).  Viewed in isolation, “„[r]egular use‟ means 
„habitual use‟ as opposed to occasional or incidental use.”  
Crum & Forster Pers. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Corp., 631 A.2d 
671, 673 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citation omitted).  However, 
the “vehicle must be „furnished or available‟ for regular use[;] 
. . . [t]his implies an understanding with the owner of the 
vehicle that the family member of the named insured could 
use the automobile of the other person at such times as he or 
she desired, if available.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
Significantly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has described 
the purpose of such provisions as preventing “the situation in 
which [the insured] may have two vehicles which they can 
use interchangeably while insuring only one of them.”  Id.; 
see also Johnson v. Braunsberg, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 659, 661 
(Pa. Com. Pl. 1970) (“Regular use” exclusion “represents an 
attempt on the part of the insurance company to strike a 
balance between the desire of the insured to be covered, even 
though not always using his own car, and its own right to 
receive payment of premiums based upon the risk presented 
by the number of automobiles operated.”).  While the 
question whether a vehicle is excluded from coverage under a 
“regular use” provision is usually a question for the jury, the 
court can decide the issue of coverage as a matter of law 
where the relevant facts are not in dispute.  Crum & Forster 
Pers. Ins. Co., 631 A.2d at 673. 
 In this case, the record does not reveal any indicia of 
habitual use or any understanding between Mr. Sweeney and 
Mr.Tradewell that Mr. Sweeney had general access to Mr. 
Tradewell‟s fleet of vehicles.  As the District Court noted, 
Mr. Tradewell‟s vehicles were available to Mr. Sweeney in 
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limited circumstances only, i.e., when one of Mr. Sweeney‟s 
customers needed a replacement vehicle while his or her 
vehicle was being repaired in Mr. Sweeney‟s shop.  And even 
when one of Mr. Sweeney‟s customers needed a rental 
vehicle, Mr. Sweeney did not as a matter of course pick up a 
vehicle from Mr. Tradewell‟s business and deliver it to the 
customer.  That was only one of several ways in which a 
customer could come into possession of one of Mr. 
Tradewell‟s rental vehicles.  Under these circumstances, Mr. 
Sweeney was not allowed “unfettered access” to Mr. 
Tradewell‟s cars, as the District Court put it.  To the contrary, 
it was limited, conditional, and infrequent, such that an 
expectation of an additional premium for Mr. Tradewell‟s 
vehicles would be unreasonable.  See Burstein v. Prudential 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204, 208-09 (Pa. 2002) 
(discussing policy concerns and “practical realities of 
insurance” animating “regular use” exclusions).  None of the 
cases cited by Liberty Mutual support its position; rather, they 
support our conclusion.  See, e.g., Prudential Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Hinson, 277 F. Supp. 2d 468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(holding “regular use” provision applied where driver “used 
either one of the two Oley Township police vehicles for 
twenty to forty hours a month, in the performance of his 
duties, over the course of approximately six years” and such 
vehicles “were readily obtainable by him whenever his full-
time schedule permitted”); Crum & Forster Pers. Ins., 631 
A.2d at 674 (holding vehicle was furnished and available for 
“regular use” to family member of the insured where he 
admitted to using subject vehicle “on an average of five times 
per week for and during the entire four years preceding the 
accident”); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shoemaker, 
965 F. Supp. 700, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd,149 F.3d 1165 
(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that important indicia of regular use 
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include “(1) blanket permission to use the car rather than 
having to request permission each time and (2) an available 
set of keys”).  Because Liberty Mutual has not put forth any 
evidence suggesting that Mr. Tradewell‟s rental cars were 
“furnished or made available for regular use” by Mr. 
Sweeney, we will affirm the District Court. 
VII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will REVERSE the 
judgment of the District Court, dismiss Liberty Mutual‟s 
cross-appeal, and remand this case to the District Court with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of Mr. Sweeney. 
